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Abstract 
 
Recent literature on the role of patents in shaping competition between 
incumbents and new entrants shows mixed evidence, as patents can 
discourage entry into markets but may also encourage potential entrants 
by increasing profitability from research and development. The increasing 
use of patents as strategic weapons motivates this investigation of the 
impact of innovation on competition. In a case study of US 
pharmaceutical cardiovascular submarkets over the period 1988-1998, 
we use a panel probit model to study the impact of a firm’s patents and 
rivals’ patents in the firm’s decision to launch new products. Our results 
show that the number of a firm’s lagged patents encourages the firm’s 
entry with new products, while rivals’ initial stock of patents discourages 
entry, but more recent patents promote entry by opening new 
technological opportunities. 
 
  JEL classification: L11, L65, C11, C23, C25. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper focuses on the impact of innovation on entry into six US cardiovascular 
pharmaceutical submarkets over the period 1987-1998. In particular, the paper sheds light on 
innovation’s impact on competition, where competition is measured as the probability that a 
company will launch additional products or a first product (i.e. greenfield entry) into a specific 
submarket.   
 
The analysis of competition among firms is one of the key topics in IO3, and several measures of 
competition, including the number of companies (Netz and Taylor, 2002) and the Lerner Index 
(Aghion et al., 2005), have been adopted over time. Following Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011), 
who stimulated interest in innovation and entry, we measure competition as the probability of 
product launches (greenfield or not) into a specific submarket4. Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011) 
investigated the role of patents in launching new products in the software market and found a 
positive correlation between firms’ patent holdings and their new product launches. They also re-
emphasized the role of patents as barriers to entry, while other literature has pointed out the role 
of patents as an indicator of innovation success, technological opportunity, and innovative 
capabilities (e.g. Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). The launch of products into a submarket also 
assumes significant importance in investigations of competition because product launches can 
be used as a proxy for market openness (Kyle, 2007). 
 
Following Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005), we use patents5 as a measure of innovation. 
According to Hall et al. (2005, p. 17), patents have long been recognized as a rich data source 
for the study of innovation and technical change, but the traditional view of patents as indicators 
of innovation has been changing because of their increasing strategic role (Boldrin and Levine, 
2013)6; as Bessel and Hunt (2007) and Rentocchini (2011) pointed out, some patents have 
become strategic instruments with which to block rivals, extract licensing revenues or do cross-
licensing, rather than instruments through which to innovate. Therefore, patents are not 
exclusively instruments that guarantee ownership of the outcomes of research and development 
(R&D). Many firms acquire large portfolios of patents “even where the primary motivation for 
                                                                
3 IO is the acronym for Industrial Organization.  
4 The first author to define submarkets as technical trajectory was Dosi (1982).  
5 Regarding this point, we quote  Gallini (2002).  
6 As Kyle (2007, p. 88) stated, “Competition usually results in lower prices, and given the 
widespread concern about the cost of pharmaceuticals, it is valuable to know what impedes 
further entry into a market.” If a company can launch into a market or submarket a new product 
that is vertically or horizontally differentiated, the barriers to entry in that market are low.  
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doing this goes beyond the potential to exclude competitors” (Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2011), 
and the phenomenon of such patent “thickets” is assuming increasing importance in many 
markets (Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2009). 
 
The analysis of patents’ effect on competition at the submarket level could add new elements to 
the debate. Our study analyzes the impact of both the firm’s and its competitors’ patents on a 
product launch in a given submarket. This analysis helps to reveal whether patents signal fear of 
the competition (the “market-stealing effect”) or disclose information or signal market dynamism 
(the “spillover effect”).  
 
With a “market-stealing effect,” patents generate property rights that give their owners an 
advantage in the industry and that  patents act as barriers to entry for competitors’ products. With 
a “spillover effect,” a rival’s patent opens new technological opportunities for firms in the same 
industry, as “the disclosure of innovation by a rival through patenting may provide information on 
which a firm can build” (McGahan and Silverman, 2006, p. 1222). These two contrasting effects 
show that the evidence on patents’ role in shaping the market environment for incumbents and 
new entrants is mixed (Cockburn and MacGarvie, 2011)7. Patents can be a significant barrier to 
new market entrants via the market-stealing effect but can also facilitate new entrants via the 
spillover effect8 by increasing the profitability of R&D when rivals’ patents lead to the firm’s 
launching new products. Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013) reconciled this two-fold 
effect of patents.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sections 2, 3, 4, and 5 present the paper’s 
motivation, dataset, variables, and model, respectively, while Section 6 analyzes the empirical 
results, and Section 7 concludes. 
 
2 Literature review  
 
Aghion et al.’s (2005) seminal paper pointed out the bi-directional relationship between 
competition and innovation and found an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the number of 
patents (as a measure of innovation) and the level of competition (measured by the Lerner 
Index). Although it also emphasizes this bi-directionality, most of the literature has focused on the 
impact of competition (market structure) on innovation. However, given the presence of feedback 
effects (e.g. Jaffe, 2000; Hall and Harho, 2012), this paper seeks evidence of innovation’s effect 
                                                                
7 However, in some circumstances, patents, acting as sunk costs, may be an encouragement to 
entry (Cabral and Ross, 2008).  
9  See chapter 1 of Sutton(1998).  
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on competition, measured by the market’s openness (i.e. the probability of being able to launch a 
new product into a submarket), and seeks to identify the impact of a firm’s own patents and that 
of its competitors’ patents on the decision to launch new products into a submarket.  
 
On the theoretical side, the most important contribution regarding the impact of innovation on a 
market’s structure belongs to Sutton (1998), who showed how the level of innovation can modify 
a market’s structure and level of competition. Sutton9 (1998) found that both horizontal and 
vertical differentiation take place in each submarket, so the number and quality of products 
launched depends on which kind of differentiation prevails: When horizontal differentiation 
prevails, the number of products is higher, regardless of quality; when vertical differentiation 
prevails, quality of new products launched is higher than the average level of quality in that 
submarket, so, the number of products is lower. 
 
The company’s decision to launching new products into various submarkets affects the 
company’s share of the submarkets, while its share of the global market depends on the strength 
or weakness of the links among submarkets, explained by the effectiveness of R&D on the 
demand side and by economies of scope on the supply side10.  
 
From an empirical point of view, the investigation of patents’ effects on product launches is 
motivated by companies’ increasing strategic use of patents (Bessel and Hunt, 2007; 
Rentocchini, 2011) and by the debate on intellectual property rights’ effect in promoting 
innovation (Boldrin and Levine, 2013). Cockburn, Henderson, and Stern (2000) discussed the 
role of patents in the pharmaceutical sector and used patents to measure firms’ accumulated 
knowledge capital and technological capabilities. For their part, Nerkar and Roberts (2004) 
modeled the success of product introductions using patents as a proxy for firms’ technological 
resources. While papers on the pharmaceutical sector have emphasized the advantage that 
property rights provide, Cockburn and MacGarvie (2011) showed how patents can discourage 
entry by competitors. Bloom, Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013) reconciled these findings by 
pointing out a two-fold effect of patents: a “market-stealing effect” and a “spillover effect.” 
                                                                
9  See chapter 1 of Sutton(1998).  
10 Specifically, Sutton (1998) stated that the global level of market concentration is measured  by 
the largest firm concentration ratio (CR1), which depends on the links among submarkets: 
stronger links increase the CR1 in the global market. The strength of the links among the 
submarkets are determined by aspects of technology and taste, where the technology side 
pertains to vertical differentiation, and the taste side pertains to horizontal differentiation. 
Horizontal differentiation also takes place in the pharmaceutical section because patients or 
doctors prefer certain drugs over others based on their side effects. 
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The current literature has not generally taken into account the role of a firm’s own patents and 
those of its competitors in new product launches; although one McGahan and Silverman (2006) is 
one of the few exceptions, they studied the effect of rivals’ patents on the focal firm’s value, not 
on the level of competition. This paper’s submarket-level analysis of the impact of a firm’s own 
patents and those of its rivals on the entry decision is a step forward. With the assignment of 
each company’s patents to a specific pharmaceutical submarket, this analysis measures patents’ 
role as either a barrier to entry or a way to disclose information to competitors in the submarkets. 
 
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
 
The primary source of data is the IMS Health dataset, from which we obtained annual sales for 
all the companies active in the pharmaceutical market in the United States from 1988 to 199811. 
The dataset refers to the sales of any product offered for purchase, classified according to the 
Anatomical Therapeutical Classification (ATC), with a breakdown up to the 3-digit level12, 
allowing us to identify the effects of competition, capture companies’ heterogeneity, and 
reproduce the analysis at the same level as that adopted by the antitrust authorities. The sales 
in real value were obtained using the US gross domestic product (GDP) deflator. We also used 
patent applications in the US cardiovascular pharmaceutical submarket from 1988 to 1998, 
obtained from the KITeS-Cespri Patent Database13, which contains information on all patent 
applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) and at the US Patent and Trademarks Office 
(USPTO). The database includes the applicant’s name, the inventor’s name, the patent class 
and all citations. 
 
The available patent data refer to only six of the nine 3-digit subsectors that belong to section “C 
Cardiovascular system” of the ATC classification. The subsections considered are listed in 
Table 1.  
Table 1 about here  
 
In terms of average sales during our observation period, the submarkets listed in Table 1 
represent about 20 percent of the pharmaceutical sector, so they are a valid sample for study. 
Patterns have emerged in the recent past that could motivate the use of a more updated 
dataset, but the paper is sufficiently general that it doesn’t depend on whether the period of 
investigation is recent14. The cost of finding and developing new drugs has changed but remains 
                                                                
11 Data collected by IMS Health was obtained by one of the authors during research conducted at 
the University of Siena, while working on the EPRIS Project. 
12 www.whocc.no/atc (ddd index). 
13For a detailed description, see http://db.kites.unibocconi.it/ 
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high, so further investigation with an updated dataset will be useful, but our analysis can 
establish a case study for other pharmaceutical submarkets and manufacturing sectors with 
similar characteristics (i.e. high entry costs). The role of a firm’s own patents and those of its 
competitors in the success of new product launches will continue to be in need of further study. 
 
Investing in new pharmaceutical products is appealing even though the success of newly 
developed products is highly uncertain given the high R&D investment required for all drugs. 
Acemouglu and Linn (2004), who analyzed the effect of market size on new drugs’ market entry, 
pointed out that a 1 percent increase in the market size for a drug category leads to a 4 to 6 
percent increase in the number of new drugs introduced to the market. 
 
We use patent data to gain information about the firms in a specific submarket. However, while 
patents can be easily assigned to firms, the IPC patent classification and the ATC classification 
for the product sold do not necessarily correspond, so we cannot necessarily associate each 
firm’s patents to a specific 3-digit ATC class. Therefore, we used information from the 
Pharmaceutical Substance (Georg Thieme Verlag), IMS Life Cycle Patent Focus (IMS Health), 
and Adis R&D Insight (Wolter Kluwer Pharma Solutions) databases, which provide information 
on pharmaceutical products, their ATC classifications and related patents. For each 3-digit ATC 
submarket in our sample, we obtained all the patents with priority dates (i.e. date of first filing) 
between 1987 and 1998 that are associated with the products classified in that submarket15. 
Then we used the patent numbers to associate each patent with its applicant. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
During the period covered by our data, thirty-six companies operated in the submarkets under 
consideration (Table 1), although the companies often operated in more than one subsector, as 
shown in Table 2. The original IMS Health dataset contains annual sales for all pharmaceutical 
products in each submarket, considered separately by presentation (e.g. tablets, ampules), 
quantity of the active ingredient (e.g. 250 mg, 500 mg), and so on. We based the identification 
of the various products on a drug code supplied by IMS Health. For example, in the 3-digit sub-
sector in Table 1, the IMS Health dataset contains 190 drug codes. Then we obtained the sales 
of a specific product by summing at the company level for each specific submarket and for each 
year the sales of all the pharmaceutical items in the dataset that were identified by the same 
code.  
                                                                
15 This work was performed by N&G Consulting (Milan, Italy) with the help of a consultancy with 
patent expertise. 
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Since we study the effect of patents on international companies’ decisions to launch new 
products into particular submarkets, we defined the Entry event,  defined as occurring when the 
sales for at least one drug code for a given company becomes greater than zero. Entry can 
refer to a greenfield entry (i.e. when a company did not previously have other products in that 
submarket) or an expansion of the range of products a company offers. Thus, we do not 
consider the number of single new products a company launches but the entry decision to 
introduce one or more products into a submarket by a company i at time t. As a result, our unit 
of analysis is “companies per submarket”; in other words, our observations are the sales of 
company i in submarket j at time t. Since not all of the companies are in all of the submarkets, 
our dataset contains 91 units of analysis and 1,092 observations. The number of entry decisions 
by submarket in the period considered and the number of observations are reported in Table 2. 
Submarkets C10A, C2A, and C3A have the most entries, but submarket C3A has the highest 
number of product launches (low-ceiling diuretics, thiazides), and submarket C10A has the 
highest number of observations. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Table 3 reports the patent applications by 3-digit class and year and compares them to the 
average number of products offered for purchase in the period. The C10A-class has the highest 
number of patents, even though its average number of products is among the smallest. 
 
Table 4 about here  
 
Table 4 shows the number of entries by company; only two companies in our sample launched 
more than ten products. 
 
4 Variables and Model 
 
The panel-probit model is a natural tool with which to analyse the Entry event, as defined in 
section 3. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Hendricks, Piccione and Tan (1997) and Netz 
and Taylor (2002), we adopted a standard entry-exit reduced-form model and analyzed the 
probability of an entry decision as a function of firm-specific and submarket-specific regressors. 
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Our variables include company characteristics like exit choices (Exit)—that is, the decision to 
reduce the number of products the company offers in a submarket; several indicators calculated 
on the basis of the company’s size that measure the its positioning in the global pharmaceutical 
market and in each submarket; and the company’s own patents and those of its competitors, 
both of which lie at the core of our analysis. The measure of the stock of patents held by a firm 
in a submarket is calculated as past patented ideas using the perpetual inventory method for 
each company in each 3-digit ATC submarket. The stock of patents is built as follows: 
 
 
where P (t-1) is the number of patents at time t-1, g is the average growth rate in patenting (firm- 
and submarket-specific), and δ is the depreciation, which is assumed to be 0.15, as is common 
in the relevant literature (e.g. Bottazzi and Peri, 2007). Patents can be weighted by citations or by 
families. Following Hall et al.’s (2005) approach, which takes into account all economic 
information, we weight the patents by citations to measure the patents’ usefulness and originality 
by designing a map of interconnections with later patents. As Hall et al. (2005) pointed out, since 
investing in further development of a patent suggests that the cited innovation is valuable, 
citations indicate the relevance of the individual patents to the submarket, especially if citations 
are still seen years after the patent is granted or if they generate more spillovers16.  
 
The submarket-specific variables considered refer to the demand for pharmaceutical products, 
an indicator of the degree of competition (measured by the number of incumbents and the 
number of products offered by competing incumbents in each submarket) and of a submarket’s 
desirability and attractiveness (measured by the size of each ATC3 submarket on the global 
pharmaceutical market). The incumbent companies’ patents in each submarket are also 
considered. The behavior of general demand for pharmaceutical goods is given by the growth 
rate of the real total prescription drug expenditures per capita in the US in the period 
considered.  
 
Data on total prescription drug expenditures comes from National Health Expenditure Accounts 
(NHEA)17, expressed in nominal terms and not adjusted to remove the impact of changes in 
healthcare prices. Although a price index for personal healthcare goods and services is available, 
                                                                
16We ran the same model using patents weighted by families, but the results were not statistically 
significant. 
17 Data are available at: https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-
Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html 
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there is no corresponding price index for the aggregate national health expenditure (NHE), so the 
data are transformed in real terms using the US consumer price index (CPI). The differences in 
the NHE’s annual growth rates reflect trends in the factors that affect healthcare spending, 
including technological developments and changes in the population’s composition by age and 
sex (demographic effect), the use of healthcare goods and services, and prices for healthcare 
goods and services. Finally, the launch of new pharmaceutical products is a long process that 
requires the company to make many decisions internal to the company and to run through many 
phases of authorization. The decision to launch a product is the last step of a long, dynamic 
process that begins with an R&D expenditure, so all of the explanatory variables in the model 
present a one-period lag to minimize loss of information while also showing the dynamic of the 
R&D process. Therefore, we employ the regressors described in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Table 6 reports the main descriptive statistics for the variables used. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
5 Model specification 
 
Given the definition of the entry decision described in Section 4, our dependent variable Entry is 
represented by a dummy variable yij,t, which takes the value of 1 if firm i decides to launch a 
new product into submarket j at time t, and zero otherwise. We used a probit model to analyze 
the role of patents on the firm’s entry decision: 
 
where (z) is the cdf of the N(0,1) distribution, and ci is the unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
 
One well known method with which to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity is to include a set 
of subject-specific parameters ci (e.g. Halaby, 2004; Wooldridge, 2005, 2010, 2011) that can be 
treated as fixed or random. The use of fixed effects could lead to the incidental parameters 
problem so, given our sample size, it may be preferable to a spare degree of freedom. As 
Wooldridge (2010, p. 286) pointed out, if the key explanatory variables do not vary much over 
time, a fixed effect estimator can lead to an imprecise estimate—that is, it can have greater 
variance. Moreover, the assumption of normal distribution for ci allows us to evaluate the 
population average effect (APE) (Wooldridge, 2010).   
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These considerations and the nature of the available data suggest a random effect probit model. 
We used STATA14 to obtain maximum likelihood estimates through the adaptive Gauss-
Hermite quadrature.  
 
Exploiting Wooldridge’s (2005) contribution related to unobserved heterogeneity and following 
Amisano and Giorgetti (2013), we entered the potential endogenous variables into the model 
with their initial conditions—that is, their values at the initial period of observation. We divided 
the covariates into three groups: x(1i), which consists of the strictly exogenous regressors; x(2i), 
which consists of the regressors that are not strictly exogenous; and x(3), which consists of the 
regressors that do not vary across units. The distribution of the random effects ci is conditioned 
on all of the average sample18 values of the regressors in x(1i) and on the initial values of x(2i). 
The resulting specification is: 
 
In particular, as in Wooldridge (2005), we assume that 
 
and we use a linear specification for the conditional expectation. In our case, the endogenous 
variables that enter with their initial conditions are: 
 
Finally, since the growth rate of the real total prescription drug expenditures per capita is 
constant across units, that variable plays the role of a time dummy. 
 
6  Results 
 
We used our results, collected in Table 7, to determine the effects of a firm’s own patents and 
those of its rivals on the probability that the firm will launch new products and found that the 
firm’s own patents promote the chances of entry, while rivals’ patents have a two-fold effect: 
their initial stock of patents (OCitj;0) has a negative effect on entry, while their most recent 
patents (Ocitj;t-1) have a positive effect. The negative effect of the initial level of patents cannot 
be considered a standard barrier to entry because the pharmaceutical sector does not usually 
                                                                
18 To reduce the number of regressors, the values of exogenous regressors enter with their mean 
values (Mundlak, 1978; Heckman, 1981). 
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feature competition among branded products so much as competition between branded and 
generic products19. This result can be interpreted more as “fear of competition” than as a 
standard barrier to entry. 
 
The positive effect of rivals’ most recent patents (Ocitj;t-1) on the probability that a firm will launch 
new products can be explained by the flow of knowledge to potential competitors and the 
opening of new technological opportunities: in this case, the patents’ “spillover effect” prevails. 
In other words, our results suggest that the rivals’ patents in the initial period are a potential 
threat to launches of new products, but over time the dissemination and the disclosure effects of 
rivals’ newer patents prevails. Our research uses a one-period lag for all patents held by 
competitors and the firm, thereby capturing the dissemination effect of knowledge better than 
the disclosure effect does.  
 
Although it should be better to have a lag of ten years when measuring the disclosure effect of 
patents (DeNicolò, 2007), taking this advice into account is impossible with the time span 
covered by our available sample period without losing a great deal of information. Our view is 
that the estimated effect of a firm’s patents can be seen as a dissemination effect more than as 
the opening of new technological opportunities. The number of competing firms (IMpj;t-1) is not 
significant, while the number of competing products (Comprodj;t-1) has a double effect. The 
lagged number of products that competitors have in a submarket is negative and significant, and 
it takes the role of a barrier to entry, while the initial number of competing products is positively 
significant. This result suggests that, although the initial number of competitors’ products could 
be considered a proxy for a submarket’s attractiveness, the number of competing products later 
becomes a disincentive to launching additional products.  
 
The measure of each submarket’s attractiveness (Apj;t-1), given by the relative weight of each 
submarket over the entire pharmaceutical sector, is not significant.  
 
Since the decision to patent in many markets is determined by the behavior of all competitors, 
the need arises to control for each submarket’s attractiveness. The presence of many patents in 
some submarkets seems to be a sort of emulation process among companies (e.g. Bloom, 
Schankerman and Van Reenen, 2013). 
 
                                                                
19 We thank Margaret Kyle for this suggestion. 
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The growth rate of the prescription drug expenditures per capita (PcExt-1), which expresses the 
dynamics of pharmaceutical demand in the US, is not significant. This result is in contrast to 
Acemoglu and Linn (2004), who found a significantly positive market size. 
 
Our estimates show that the regressors DG and DS, which measure the relative size of each 
company in the pharmaceutical market and in each submarket, respectively, and are used to 
capture the predation effect by incumbents, have no effect. 
 
Table 7 about here  
 
Table 8 about here 
 
Table 8 shows the Average Marginal Effects (AME) and the elasticities. Competitive products’ 
elasticity indicates that they are a deterrent to launching additional products, while incumbents’ 
patents have positive elasticity. 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
This paper presents an analysis of patents’ impact on competition, where competition is 
measured by the probability that a firm will launch an additional product. Our results show that a 
firm’s own recent patents promote the chances of launching another product, while the 
firm’sown initial patents have little influence. This result is in line with other results in the 
literature. 
An additional focus lies on the rivals’patents. 
 
 
The analysis is performed for the pharmaceutical sector in United States in the period 1988-
1998. Patterns have emerged in the recent past that could motivate the use of a more updated 
dataset (Chandra, Garthwaite and Stern, 2017; Chandra and Garthwaite, 2018) since changes 
have occurred recently in the pharmaceutical sector that have: a) reduced the efficiency of R&D 
(although the costs for new molecular entities are decreasing), b) shifted the sector from 
traditional to personalized drugs, c) increased research on orphan drugs, and d) increased 
interest in oncological products and those for autoimmune diseases. However, the paper’s case 
study is sufficiently general that it doesn’t depend on whether the period of investigation is 
recent or more distant.  
 
Our results show that incumbents’ patents can have either positive or negative effects on entry. 
Incumbents’ initial successes in exploiting existing technological opportunities can frustrate 
13 
 
entrant’s efforts and, thus, discourage entry, as suggested by the patent literature (Aoki, 1991) 
and Kyle (2007), who found that rivals’ patents induce a sort of fear of competition. On the other 
hand, incumbents’ most recent patent holdings appear to promote entry, suggesting that new 
information flows to competitors through patents and opens new technological opportunities for 
them. In this case, the “spillover effect” prevails, showing a dissemination effect. 
 
Our research also finds a double effect of competitor’s patents: a spillover effect and a barrier-
to-entry effect. These effects, neglected by the literature regarding their impact on the launch of 
products and the level of competition (with the exception of Gahan and Silverman, 2006) 
deserve further analysis in other manufacturing sectors as well. The prevalence of one of these 
effects over the other will depend on the sector’s technology level since R&D-intensive sectors 
behave differently from other sectors. At the same time, the evaluation of these effects must 
take into account the role that emulation plays (Bloom, Schankerman and VanReenen, 2013), 
such that, in some sectors all competitors will decide to issue patents because of a general 
tendency to do so. A way to take this role into consideration is by introducing the attractiveness 
of each submarket, as done in the present paper, but a richer dataset can offer other 
possibilities and underscore the recent increase in the use of patents as strategic tools (Bessel 
and Hunt, 2007; Rentocchini, 2011), so our study could be a useful starting point for 
comparative analysis. Performing the same analysis in other sectors could help policymakers 
disentangle the spillover effect and the barrier to entry effect of rivals’ patents by enriching the 
most recent debate on the effect of patents in promoting innovation (Boldrin and Levine, 2013).  
 
The results obtained from our case study also have some policy implications in the framework of 
the recent debate on the role of patents in promoting innovation (see, e.g., Boldrin and Levine, 
2013). An increased level of intellectual property rights has not always been associated with an 
increased level of innovation’; in fact, the opposite has sometimes happened. A prime example 
is the computer software sector (Boldrin and Levine, 2013), where “the contemporary FLOSS 
(Free Libre and Open Source Software) community is [an] example of how collaboration and 
exchange of ideas can thrive without the monopoly power granted by patents” (Boldrin and 
Levine, 2013) 20. 
 
Patents’ contribution to fostering innovation and the revision of intellectual property rights 
regimes could be re-evaluated by giving the right attention to the role of rivals’ patents, taking 
into account the increasing use of defensive patenting and patent trolls (Boldrin and Levine, 
                                                                
20 In several cases the rich flourishing innovation of open source software has been motivated by 
the high cost of patented products.  
14 
 
2013). The challenge will be to use new data to take into account the dual role of rivals’ patents 
by controlling whether new products are protected by patents.  
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Code Description 
  
C1C Cardiac stimulants excl. cardiac glycosides 
C2A Antiadrenergic agents, centrally acting 
C3A Low-ceiling diuretics, thiazides 
C4A Peripheral vasodilators 
C5A Agents for treatment of hemorrhoids and anal fissures for topical use 
C10A Lipid modifying agents, plain 
  
 
Table 1: 3-digit Cardiovascular Submarkets considered 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submarket 
n. companies 
operating in 
Each 
Submarket 
N. obser. Entry 
C1C 9 108 15 
C2A 20 240 33 
C3A 26 312 40 
C4A 12 144 19 
C5A 8 96 13 
C10A 16 192 33 
Total  1092                    153 
 
Table 2: Companies, Number of observations and Entries by Submarket 
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Total num
. O
f patents  
Average num
ber of 
products 
              . 
C1C 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 6 1 4 0 18 16 
C2A 1 1 0 2 2 0 2 4 6 5 4 0 27 29 
C3A 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 7 62 
C4A 2 6 5 4 7 1 2 5 7 6 5 0 50 14 
C5A 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 2 1 0 1 2 10 14 
C10A 8 12 6 8 6 15 19 12 19 23 4 2 134 14 
               
 
Table 3: Number of Patent Applications by Submarket and Year  
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Num of Entries N. of firms 
  
1-2 14 
3-5 11 
6-8 6 
9-10 3 
11 2 
Total 153 
  
 
Table 4: Companies by Entry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  Description 
Exitij;t-1 Built in a way similar to the Entry event, the lagged variable Exit measures company ’'s 
decision to withdraw at time t1 one or more products from the submarket j. 
Citij;t-1 The lagged number of a firm’s own patents, weighted by citations, into a particular 
submarket, evaluated according to equation (1).  
Ocitj;t-1 The lagged number of patents, weighted by citations, competitors own in a particular 
submarket, evaluated according to equation (1).   
Comprodj;t-1 The lagged number of products offered by competing incumbents in each submarket.  
IMpj;t-1 The lagged number of competing incumbent companies in each submarket, as a 
measure of competition.  
PcExt-1 The growth rate of the per-capita real total prescription drug expenditures in US in the 
period considered. Since this variable is constant across units, it plays the roles of time 
dummies. 
Apj;t-1 The attractiveness of each submarket given by the ratio of the total sales in submarket j 
to the total sales in the whole market. 
DGi;t-1 The relative distance between company i’s sales and those of the company with the 
largest sales in the whole market, lagged at time t. 
 
DGi;t= 
DSij;t-1 1, the relative distance between company i’s sales and those of the company with the 
largest sales in the submarket j, lagged at time t-1:  
 
DSij;t= 
 
Table 5: Variable Definitions 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min.   Max. 
     
Cit    16.20 40.40 0.0  307.2 
Ocit  262.60 277.90 3.8  997.6 
Comprod    29.50 19.90 6.0    64.0 
IMp    14.50 7.20 6.0    25.0 
PcEx      7.80 3.20 2.5    12.3 
Ap      0.01 0.012 .001    .056 
DG      0.67 0.32 0     .99 
DS      0.84 0.28 0     1.0 
     
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics  
 
 
Variable coe std. err. z p-value 
     
Exit
ij;t-1 -0.176 0.150 -1.17 0.242 
Cit
ij;t-1 0.007 0.003 2.15 0.032 
Ocit
ij;t-1 0.002 0.001 2.16 0.031 
Comprodij;t-1 -0.122 0.043 -2.84 0.004 
IMp
ij;t-1 0.028 0.041 0.67 0.503 
PcExt-1 -0.012 0.022 -0.54 0.588 
Ap
ij;t-1 6.920 8.983 0.77 0.441 
DG
i;t-1 -1.094 0.839 -1.30 0.192 
DS
ij;t-1 -0.397 0.435 -0.91 0.361 
Exitij;0 0.071 0.320 0.22 0.824 
Comprodij;0 0.110 0.037 2.96 0.003 
DGi;0 1.302 0.816 1.60 0.110 
DSij;0 0.323 0.480 0.67 0.501 
Citij;0 -0.005 0.004 -1.51 0.130 
Ocitij;0 -0.002 0.001 -2.18 0.030 
Const -1.542 0.343 -4.49 0.000 
 
Table 7: Probit estimates 
 
 
Variable AME Elast. 
   
Exit
ij;t-1 -0.020 -0.127 
Cit
ij;t-1 7.e-4 0.204 
Ocit
ij;t-1 2.e-4 1.019 
Comprodij;t-1 -0.014 -7.526 
IMp
ij;t-1 0.003 0.830 
PcExt  1 -0.001 -0.183 
Ap
ij;t-1 0.799 0.184 
DG
i;t-1 -0.126 -1.482 
DSij;t 1 -0.046 -0.694 
 
Table 8: Probit estimates: marginal effects and elasticities 
